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This four-part study is a critical analysis of several reports dealing with the reform of the
financial system in the United States. The study uses Minsky’s framework of analysis and
focuses on the implications of Ponzi finance for regulatory and supervisory policies. The
main conclusion of the study is that, while all reports make some valuable suggestions,
they fail to deal with the socioeconomic dynamics that emerge during long periods of
economic stability. As a consequence, it is highly doubtful that the principal suggestions
contained in the reports will provide any applicable means to limit the worsening of
financial fragility over periods of economic stability. The study also concludes that any
meaningful systemic and prudential regulatory changes should focus on the analysis of
expected and actual cash flows (sources and stability) rather than capital equity, and on
preventing the emergence of Ponzi processes. The latter tend to emerge over long periods
of economic stability and are not necessarily engineered by crooks. On the contrary, the
pursuit of economic growth may involve the extensive use of Ponzi financial processes in
legal economic activities. The study argues that some Ponzi processes—more precisely,
pyramid Ponzi processes—should not be allowed to proceed, no matter how severe the
immediate impact on economic growth, standards of living, or competitiveness. This is so
because pyramid Ponzi processes always collapse, regardless how efficient financial
markets are, how well informed and well behaved individuals are, or whether there is a
“bubble” or not. The longer the process is allowed to proceed, the more destructive it
becomes. Pyramid Ponzi processes cannot be risk-managed or buffered against; if
economic growth is to be based on a solid financial foundation, these processes cannot be
allowed to continue. Finally, a supervisory and regulatory process focused on detecting
Ponzi processes would be much more flexible and adaptive, since it would not be
preoccupied with either functional or product limits, or with arbitrary ratios of
“prudence.” Rather, it would oversee all financial institutions and all products, no matter
how new or marginal they might be.
See also, Working Paper Nos. 574.1, 574.2, and 574.4.
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THE GROUP OF THIRTY: FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 
Summary 
The report notes that the crisis has revealed major weaknesses at the institutional, market, 
regulatory, policy, and infrastructure levels in terms of weak credit appraisal and underwriting 
standards, extreme credit concentration, misjudged maturity mismatches, excessive use of 
leverage and off-balance sheet operations, overconfidence in market liquidity, weakness in 
regulatory and governance practices, and a flawed credit rating system.  
The report also notes that the crisis has profoundly changed the financial sector by 
generating a strong concentration of financial companies. The Group is worried that this may 
lead to unfair competition, conflicts of interest and moral hazard (too big to fail argument); as a 
consequence, the report argues that large and complex bank holding companies need to be held 
to more rigorous standards of prudential regulation and supervision. In addition, intra-firm 
regulation should be focused on long-run performance, and “strong and independent risk 
management staffs” (Group of Thirty 2009: 19) should be created in conjunction with well-
balanced compensation policies. 
The main goal of the Group is to set up a regulatory framework oriented toward 
containing systemic risk and maintaining a close oversight of “systematically important” 
financial companies. According to the Group, a “systematically significant” institution is one that 
is of large size, that has an asset side composed mostly of illiquid assets and a liability side 
highly leveraged and composed mainly of short-term debts, that is highly interconnected in terms 
of size and range of OTC derivative market contracts and counterparty risk, and that performs 
services that are central to the stability of the economic system (clearing, settlement, and 
payment systems). 
Given its diagnostic and core principles, the Group proposes four core recommendations. 
First, given that under-regulated and unregulated financial institutions were central for the 
emergence and spreading of the subprime crisis, and given the high concentration of financial 
activities, it is necessary to eliminate gaps and weaknesses in the regulatory structure and to 
reassess the role of the central bank. In terms of prudential supervision, government-insured 
deposit-taking institutions should have a single regulator, large banking institutions should not be 
allowed to enter activities (like private equity funds) that generate high risk and conflicts of   4
interest, and they should own a significant portion of the risk of the assets they securitized. 
Government-insured deposit-taking institutions should not be owned or controlled by 
unregulated financial organizations. In terms of non-bank financial institutions, their supervision 
should be consolidated, money-market funds should focus on providing safe placement options 
and should move their bank-like deposits off-balance sheet by creating a special purpose bank. 
Private pools of capital should be registered and those with a “size judged to be potentially 
systemically significant” (Group of Thirty 2009: 31) should be regulated in terms of capital, 
liquidity and risk management. Finally, government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) should be 
either completely privatized or fully public.  
Second, the effectiveness of prudential supervision should be improved by eliminating 
overlaps, by allowing the central bank to collect information about systemic stability and to 
counter financial excesses through countercyclical regulatory and supervisory policies, by 
developing international coordination, and by defining leverage more precisely and collecting 
broad data that can be compared.  
Third, institutional policies and standards must be improved by improving governance, 
risk management, and capital and liquidity requirements. In terms of governance and risk 
management, the previous policies and standards should be coordinated to meet the long-term 
interest of shareholders, and risk managers should be more independent and perform periodic 
reviews. In terms of regulatory capital standards, regulators must prevent the emergence of 
excessive risk taking in good times (Group of Thirty 2009: 42). They can do so by defining more 
accurately economic capital more relative to risk preferences. In terms of liquidity risk 
management, liquidity standards should be established and be based on a firm’s capacity to 
maintain ample liquidity under stress conditions (Group of Thirty 2009: 44). Finally, in terms of 
fair valuation accounting, mark-to-market valuation is not adapted to financial institutions that 
fund illiquid assets with short-term funding, and it may have no relationship to expected 
discounted cash flows and may allow recorded gains unrelated to the capacity to run a business 
properly.  
Fourth, one needs to improve the transparency and resiliency of markets, by restoring 
confidence in securitized markets through a careful monitoring of innovations, by reforming 
credit rating agencies to make sure that conflicts of interest are limited and by broadening the 
significance of the rating beyond credit risk, by overseeing CDS and OTC markets, and by   5
improving the transparency of structured products through a cooperation between regulators and 
security buyers to determine the appropriate information to provide (Group of Thirty 2009: 55). 
 
Critical review 
The report brings forward some important “weaknesses” that have contributed to the crisis but it 
does not try to explain how they came to be; rather it focuses on means to try to correct those 
problems. One of the focuses of the report is the reinforced attention that should be given to large 
financial companies, especially those that are government insured. The emphasis put on systemic 
stability is very welcome, and the recognition of the needs for authorities to orient their policy 
implementation toward achieving this goal is a breath of fresh air. Where the report probably 
does not go far enough is in recognizing that all financial institutions, big or small, government 
insured or not, new or old, need to be well regulated, and that a central criterion to judge if a 
financial institution is systematically relevant is the criterion of Ponzi finance. 
The report emphasizes the importance of high maturity mismatch and new leverage as 
criteria to define a systemically relevant institution; however, it does not tell us what “high” 
means, which can lead to two problems. First, a “high” leverage ratio may in fact be perfectly 
sound if cash flows from liabilities can be met by net cash inflows from operational assets. As 
Minsky noted, the leverage ratio and the debt-to-income ratio are too narrow in their 
measurement of financial fragility: 
Inasmuch as the nature of mortgage debt changed markedly between 1929 and 1962, the 
larger household debt-income ratio in 1962 may not indicate a greater sensitivity to a 
shock. (Minsky 1963 (1982): 10) 
What we really would need (and that is not available for the moment) is a measure of cash flow 
ratios or cash-flow mismatch. It is not just a question of maturity but also, and mainly, a question 
of the size of the cash inflow relative to the size of cash outflows. Thus, setting arbitrary leverage 
ratios can lead to regulatory practices that are too restrictive.  
Second, setting an arbitrary regulatory leverage ratio leads financial companies that meet 
the ratio to be strongly reluctant to more careful examination. This may not only push regulators 
and supervisors to become more lenient in front of strong political pressures, but also may lead 
regulators to believe that everything is fine when the financial situation of companies is 
worsening fast. Thus, concerns about financial stability should be permanent, especially when   6
the economy is doing well. “Normal/wise” growth of credit, “normal/wise” use of leverage, 
relative to an arbitrary ratio, should be of great concern because stability leads to instability by 
leading to Ponzi financial practices that may be hidden, or lagged, by data. What matters is not 
the normality relative to a trend but the types of financial practice; in fact, it is during periods of 
time when all ratios seem appropriate that Ponzi financial practices usually emerge. This is even 
more so where financial companies have mastered so-called “creative” accounting, i.e. frauds. 
Similarly, the criteria of size or government insurance are not appropriate to determine a 
systematically relevant institution. For example, for the regulation of private equity funds the 
report states that:  
For funds above a size judged to be potentially systemically significant, the prudential 
regulator should have authority to establish appropriate standards for capital, liquidity, 
and risk management. (Group of Thirty 2009: 31) 
This criterion of size, while obvious for the largest institutions, is hard to implement for other 
institutions. In addition, even small institutions can be systematically significant. As the 
mortgage crisis has shown, thousands of small unregulated loan brokers encouraged both prime 
and non-prime borrowers to take mortgages at terms that were Ponzi. All financial institutions 
should be regulated independent of size or government insurance. This is all the more so that 
Ponzi processes tend to emerge first in unregulated areas (that are not government insured), and 
that Ponzi processes are an intrinsic result of economic stability. Thus, moral hazard should not 
be the main focus of regulation and supervision because non-insured institutions can be a source 
of Ponzi finance. Rather the focus should be the emergence of financial practices that rely on 
liquidation and refinancing as a means to complete financial deals. This will set up the right 
conditions for the emergence of what Minsky called “systemic moral hazard” (Campbell and 
Minsky 1987: 257). The latter results from the fact that the greater economic stability provided 
by big government encouraged to take more risk and reinforced the dynamics induced by 
economic stability: 
One achievement of deposit insurance, along with stability provided by fiscal and 
monetary policy, has been to decrease the risk aversion that can be a barrier to investment 
and which can prevent the economy from realizing a close approximation to full 
employment. By stabilizing the flow of deposit liabilities into and out of deposit 
institutions, deposit insurance facilitates the financing of long term investments with   7
short term instruments. But attenuation of risk aversion involves systemic moral hazard. 
As the risk aversion of entrepreneurs, financiers and the ultimate holders of assets is 
diminished, the likelihood increases that payoffs by the insurance agencies will be needed. 
(Campbell and Minsky 1987: 257) 
Thus, it is not a question of just insured vs. non-insured companies, all financial institutions and 
non-financial institutions, as well as households, are drawn into taking more risk, and ultimately 
excessive risk, because of the greater economic stability provided by a big government. Thus, all 
financial institutions should be regulated. 
The report correctly notes that we need to focus our attention more closely on accounting 
for systemic risk through more accurate data and through a better fair valuation process. For 
example, the report notes that market-to-market valuation generates the “ability of distressed 
institutions to increase their reported earnings by marking to market of certain of their own 
liabilities as the credit risk on their debt has increased” (Group of Thirty 2009: 44). If there was a 
cash-flow oriented supervision and regulation of financial institutions and of the aggregate 
economy, the size and growth of this type of “earnings” could be detected very rapidly and 
considered dangerous and could allow regulators to intervene fast. The S&L crisis is a very good 
example of that with companies self-righteously and loudly rebuffing more supervision on the 
basis that the companies were profitable, when the source of this profitability was a Ponzi 
process (Black 2005). As already noted earlier, profitability has nothing to do with the capacity 
to run a healthy business, even the most financially rotten institution can return huge profits. 
What we need is an understanding of the sources of cash inflows and sources of cash outflows, 
as well as of the position-making practices.  
A similar idea should be applied to financial innovations before they are included in the 
economy. Even though the report recognizes, contrary to other reports, that regulators have a role 
to play in the information provided to financial investors, it is not enough to disclose more 
information about financial risk because the willingness to take risk changes over time. Ponzi 
financial innovations should not be allowed to exist in the first place because they are 
unsustainable, even if financial institutions have the full information available to access risk 
involved and even if they are “highly sophisticated.” 
Finally, the report assumes that the high concentration of the financial industry is more or 
less a done deal (Group of Thirty 2009: 26). However, especially now that most big financial   8
holding companies are insolvent, the government could intervene to break them down and make 
them easier to supervise and to regulate, while also making sure that their overall business 
structure and culture are coherent. The breaking down of companies could be made in order to 
promote competition, but, and this is another weakness of the report, competition also contains 
dangers. Too much competition leads to a fuite en avant to obtain market shares by all means, 
legal or illegal. Thus, we need smaller institutions but we also need constructive competition, i.e., 
competition that gives the incentive to generate welfare gains for society. Smaller institutions 
would also be much easier to regulate and to supervise, and this should be an essential criterion 
to set a maximum size limit to financial institutions; if supervisors cannot supervise a company 
properly, do not allow it to merge with, or acquire, other companies. In order to limit constraints 
on economic growth, this would imply increasing the staffing and education of supervisors.  
The current crisis is putting a lot of pressure on regulators and supervisors to perform 
better and to perform complex stress tests. But regulatory and supervisory institutions have been 
understaffed, under-qualified, underfunded and undermined which has prevented an effective 
supervision. Government institutions must be able to attract the best minds:  
To be effective, the SEC cannot afford to be less talented and educated than the industry, 
and I would argue it can’t even strive to be as good as the industry, it needs to be better! 
(Markopolos 2009: 42) 
This implies raising salaries significantly, increasing the information provided to regulatory 
institutions, and giving them broad powers, while also making them fully accountable to the 
public (in the sense that it performs the task it was set up to perform independently of socio-
political pressures not to perform this task). In addition, senior regulators and heads of regulatory 
institutions should have most of their career behind them, and should have enough experience to 
understand that systemic stability is not a given. This would allow regulatory institutions to be 
more independent from the financial sector because the top managers would not have an 
incentive to be lenient in order to be sure to find a good job back in the financial sector, or 
somewhere else.   9
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT: 
STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
Summary 
The report focuses on two major areas where the OECD thinks significant changes should occur. 
The first area concerns finance, competition and corporate governance, the second area concerns 
long-term economic growth.  
In terms of the first area, the report notes that the current crisis “is the result of both 
market failures and policy failures” and that recent events “demonstrate the importance of a 
strong and effective regulatory framework and proper supervision” (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 2009: 9). Thus, sound regulatory framework and sound 
governance are necessary. For that to happen, capital requirements, rewards (net of tax) and 
regulations must be set appropriately in order to give an incentive to make decisions consistent 
with the long-term interest of shareholders, to avoid procyclical regulations and to avoid gaps in 
the regulatory framework. In addition, given that the crisis has led to a consolidation of the 
financial system “competition may be weaker, leading to higher costs of credit and other 
financial services to consumers and businesses” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2009: 10). Thus, it is important to restore and to maintain a highly competitive 
market structure in order to promote “innovation, competitiveness and productivity.” Finally, 
consumer protection and education should be improved to make sure that individuals can 
understand the financial risks involved. 
In terms of long-term growth, the best way to promote it is to avoid protectionism, to 
keep “sound macroeconomic, fiscal and labor market policies for stability and resilience,” and to 
promote innovation-led recovery and others. The report notes especially that: 
Policy makers will have to be very attentive to medium-term inflation trends and 
unsustainable accumulations of government debt. Correction of the extraordinary 
monetary easing implemented almost everywhere will have to be swift as recovery gets 
underway […] medium-term challenge is to shift more forcefully from macroeconomic 
policy pro-cyclicality to strong, explicit counter-cyclicality, in order to reduce the 
likelihood of future bust and booms. (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2009: 13) 
   10
In addition, the report notes that: 
However, it must be kept in mind that such massive intervention could produce very 
undesirable consequences in the medium run by distorting the incentive structure for 
households, firms, and financial intermediaries […] It could also distort the structure and 
size of government budgets and debt, endangering fiscal sustainability and reducing 
resources for long-term growth (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2009: 13) 
As a consequence, the OECD recommends a “timely, targeted, and temporary” government 
intervention (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2009: 13). 
 
Critical review 
Like most of the previous reports, the OECD report recognizes the need to have a more balanced 
approach to regulation compared to what has prevailed for the past 30 years. However, the 
emphasis on competition and innovation as the source of all good things is inappropriate. We 
have seen previously that too much competition promotes sloppy underwriting standards, unsafe 
and unreliable financial innovations, and a fuite en avant. What we need is not more competition 
but better competition, i.e. competition that rewards meaningful innovations and that prevents 
hurtful financial practices. Having a patent system would help to do that if the latter was 
provided by the government on the condition that a financial product would not promote Ponzi 
finance. Not all financial innovations are good for economic growth and competitiveness as the 
current crisis clearly illustrates. Other methods of intervention that discourage and forbid lenient 
decisions made for the sake of gaining or maintaining market share should also be promoted. 
This is all the more so that over a period of good times, market mechanisms force financial 
institutions to take excessive risk and to become too lenient in their asset and liability 
managements. 
The emphasis on consumer education and information is valuable but it will not prevent 
the emergence of financial instability because information is interpreted, and sometimes ignored, 
in the functions of the social mood and of pressures to meet targeted rates of return. In addition, 
better information reinforces the sense of control, which boosts confidence to take more risk 
without necessarily increasing the quality of decisions. This compounds the effect of competition 
and market-share pressures on risk aversion.   11
Regarding economic growth, the report clearly notes the importance of analyzing the 
medium- and long-term impacts of reliquifying the balance sheets of the private sector. However, 
for Minsky, this implies that a permanent and broad government intervention is necessary 
through regulation and supervision. Rather than inflation, the main worry is that highly liquid 
balance sheets, coupled with a period of stability during which profitability is judged reasonable, 
create very strong financial incentives to take too much risk (i.e., to enter into Ponzi finance 
processes and/or fraudulent/overly optimistic hedge finance processes). Minsky noted that the 
long period of stability following World War II was not a period with high inflation but rather 
one when financial institutions tried to find ways (and did find ways) to leverage their enormous 
cash and T-bond reserves. They did so to a point that financial crises progressively became more 
and more frequent (Minsky 1983). Thus, the government needs to intervene continuously against 
the emergence of Ponzi financing, even when the private sector, and politicians, are hungry for 
high economic growth in order to regain the ground lost during a recession. Moreover, rather 
than a question of fiscal sustainability as defined arbitrarily in terms of an arbitrary ratio of 
public debt to GDP or other criterion, the federal fiscal position should be left whatever it needs 
to be (surplus or deficit) given the financial needs of the domestic private sector and the rest of 
the world (Wray 2003). Sound Finance is not a good way to understand government financial 
and accounting operations. The federal government finances are different from business or 
household finances and usually must be in deficit in order to meet the net saving needs of private 
domestic entities and of the rest of the world. Finally, when setting fiscal and monetary policy 
agenda, financial stability should be a central matter to account for. Fiscal surpluses drain funds 
out of the private sector and contribute to the weakening of economic entities, which contributes 
to the growth of financial fragility. This is all the more so that politicians love to set goals to 
reach a surplus, especially when the economy has been doing well for a while. Similarly, when 
the central bank raises its interest rate to fight inflation, this contributes to financial fragility and 
this should be put in the balance before moving interest upward too rapidly. A fragile financial 
system is not conducive to active monetary policy, which unfortunately members of the Federal 
Open Market Committee have tended to ignore (Tymoigne 2009).  
Finally, the question of aligning the compensation and risk management systems to the 
shareholders interest is problematic for two reasons. First, for the purpose of financial stability, 
what matters is not the interest of a particular group or the achievement of specific objectives. 
Systemic stability is what matters and should be the paramount goal to achieve independently of   12
the interest of anybody because systemic stability is required for the fulfillment of the interest of 
specific categories of individuals. Thus, rather than the shareholders’ interest what should matter 
is the capacity to create compensation and risk management systems that allow a company to 
continue to operate as a going-concern. Second, not only are going-concern and shareholders’ 
interest misaligned, but the creation of derivative contracts, like credit default swaps (for 
bondholders) and equity default swaps (for shareholders), has created perverse incentives that 
may encourage stakeholders to wish a company would become insolvent: 
One key assumption is that creditors generally want to keep a solvent firm out of 
bankruptcy and (apart from intercreditor matters) want to maximize the value of an 
insolvent firm. These assumptions can no longer be relied on. Credit default swaps and 
other credit derivatives now permit formal ownership of debt claims to be “decoupled” 
from economic exposure to the risk of default or credit deterioration. […] There could, 
for instance, be a situation involving an “empty creditor”: a creditor may have the control 
rights flowing from the debt contract but, by simultaneously holding credit default swaps, 
have little or no economic exposure to the debtor. The creditor would have little incentive 
to work with a troubled corporation for it to avoid bankruptcy. Indeed, if it holds enough 
credit default swaps, it may simultaneously have control rights and a negative economic 
exposure. In such a situation, the creditor would have incentives to cause the firm’s value 
to fall. (Hu 2008: 6-7) 
This compounds the problems that Veblen analyzed at the beginning of the 20
th century in his 
Absentee Ownership and Theory of the Business Enterprises. We now have empty ownership, or 
“empty voting” for which “shares [have] voting rights, but [have] been emptied of the economic 
ownership that customarily accompanies those rights” (Hu and Black 2008: 634). This also 
reinforces the idea that capital equity is not a good protection against issues of moral hazard. In 
addition, empty voting creates additional doubts that mark-to-market can provide a meaningful 
measure of the solvency of a company. Indeed, financial market participants may have an 
incentive to undervalue a company in order to create a false sense of insolvency, even though the 
core business of a company may be strong.   13
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND 
ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY SYSTEM 
Summary 
The GAO notes, quoting SEC Chairman Cox, that “the last six months have made it abundantly 
clear that voluntary regulation does not work.” The report also notes that the current regulatory 
and supervisory frameworks are unable to deal with financial holding companies and systemic 
risk: 
The existing U.S. regulatory system is not well-equipped for identifying and addressing 
risks across the financial system as a whole. In the current environment, with multiple 
regulators primarily responsible for just individual institutions or markets, no one 
regulator is tasked with assessing the risks posed across the entire financial system by a 
few institutions or by the collective activities of the industry. (Government 
Accountability Office 2009: 22) 
The current mortgage crisis has shown that numerous entities were involved in the boom process, 
some of them with no regulators. Thus, in addition to measuring risk for a specific product or 
activity, we need an enterprise-wide measure of risk and across-institutions approach to 
regulation and supervision. In addition, some hedge funds and other institutions (credit rating 
agencies and special purpose entities) need to be regulated and supervised more carefully, 
especially now that they play a crucial role in the financial sector (Government Accountability 
Office 2009: 29). The same applies to complex financial products, and regulators need to step up 
to the challenge of providing adequate consumer protection, if necessary by banning some 
products. However, the report also notes that banning financial products, while it can be done, is 
a difficult thing to do: 
Although the Federal Reserve took steps in 2001 to ban some practices, such as engaging 
in a pattern or practice of refinancing certain high-cost loans when it is not in the 
borrower’s interest, it did not act again until 2008, when it banned additional products 
and practices, such as certain loans with limited documentation. In a 2007 testimony, a 
Federal Reserve official noted that writing such rules is difficult, particularly since 
determinations of unfairness or deception depend heavily on the facts of an individual 
case. (Government Accountability Office 2009: 43)   14
In addition, the process of judging the safety of financial products and of setting proper 
regulation, supervision, and accounting has been slowed by the need to coordinate among 
multiple regulatory agencies, and by the increasing complexity of financial products. 
The GAO provides nine focus points for financial reform in order to improve regulation 
and supervision: 
Making changes that better position regulators to oversee firms and products that pose 
risks to the financial system and consumers and to adapt to new products and participants 
as these arise would seem essential to ensuring that our financial services sector 
continues to serve our nation’s needs as effectively as possible. (Government 
Accountability Office 2009: 48) 
First, regulatory goals should be clearly defined and be focused, among others, on consumer 
protections, integrity and fairness of markets, safety and soundness of institutions, and stability 
of the overall financial system. Second, regulation should be “appropriately comprehensive,” that 
is, it should concern enough institutions to meet the goals without “hampering innovation, capital 
formation, and economic growth” (Government Accountability Office 2009: 52). Third, there 
should be a system-wide regulator that identifies, monitors, and manages the risks of the entire 
financial system, whatever the institution or type of risk. “Such a regulator could assess the 
systemic risks that arise at financial institutions, within specific financial sectors, across the 
nation, and globally.” (Government Accountability Office 2009: 54). Fourth, regulation should 
be flexible and forward looking in order to adapt to market innovations, but it should avoid 
“unnecessarily hindering innovation” (Government Accountability Office 2009: 54). Fifth, 
regulation should be “efficient and effective,” that is, it should eliminate overlaps between 
institutions and should streamline regulatory enforcement and supervision. This implies better 
coordination among state and federal governments but also among nations. Sixth, consumer and 
financial-investor protection should be consistent, by providing more information and improving 
financial literacy, and by extending suitability requirements that security brokers must meet 
before recommending a security to a client. Seventh, regulators should be independent and 
accountable. Eighth, there should be a consistent financial oversight and transparency to limit 
negative competitive outcomes. Ninth, taxpayers’ exposure should be minimal by making sure 
that regulators have good safeguards, notably by thriving to minimize systemic risk and 
attracting high quality staff.   15
 
Critical Review 
This is a very stimulating report that contains valuable insights. The emphasis on system-wide 
risk and goal-oriented regulation is especially relevant as is the need to streamline regulation. 
There is a lack of a core principle, however, to give some guidance regarding how to reform 
regulation and to capture systemic risk. This becomes especially clear when the report notes that 
regulation should be proactive and adaptable: 
Important questions also exist about the extent to which financial regulators should 
actively monitor and, where necessary, approve new financial products and services as 
they are developed to ensure the least harm from inappropriate products. Some 
individuals commenting on this framework, including industry representatives, noted that 
limiting government intervention in new financial activities until it has become clear that 
a particular activity or market poses a significant risk and therefore warrants intervention 
may be more appropriate. (Government Accountability Office 2009: 54) 
The fear is that by not letting all financial innovations have a trial period in the real world, we 
will hinder economic growth and competitiveness, and so standards of living. This leads to a 
suggestion that regulation should be reactive and should exist only when “significant risk” exists. 
This argument had been put forward previously not to regulate hedge funds, credit default swaps, 
and others financial practices. It usually has been reinforced by advocating the sophistication of 
financial investors: 
Because their participants are presumed to be sophisticated and therefore not require the 
full protection offered by the securities laws, hedge funds have not generally been subject 
to direct regulation. Therefore, hedge funds are not subject to regulatory capital 
requirements, are not restricted by regulation in their choice of investment strategies, and 
are not limited by regulation in their use of leverage. (Government Accountability Office 
2009: 29) 
Thus, even though the GAO advocates a proactive regulation, reactive regulation is reentering 
from the backdoor. 
To avoid such problem we need a criterion that helps to decide which financial practices 
are safe or not before they are implemented in the real world. Minsky provides a clear criterion: 
Ponzi finance. If a financial product is Ponzi under any circumstances, it should be completely   16
forbidden. This will promote the competitiveness of financial companies over the long run by 
limiting the emergence of Ponzi processes. Competitiveness could be reinforced by allowing 
some financial institutions to operate in a protected market once their invention is certified to be 
safe for a specific category of customers (or all customers). That would give an incentive to 
companies to create relevant financial products that meet the needs of the productive system and 
that are safe to operate, which in turn would contribute to increase the competitiveness of all 
economic units. Once introduced, financial innovations and practices should be constantly 
monitored to detect and to eliminate any degenerative use. That is why a complete regulation of 
all financial institutions is necessary, without exception of size (too small to matter), novelty (too 
young to die), leverage (too few debts to be risky), or any other criterion.   17
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR MONETARY AND BANKING STUDIES: THE 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Summary 
The ICMBS report (hereafter Geneva report) starts with an analytical framework that provides 
the foundations for the regulatory recommendations presented in the rest of the report. The 
analytical framework relies heavily on the interaction between the value of asset prices (used as 
collateral and to measure net worth) and willingness to lend. On the upside, this ultimately leads 
to a boom period during which funding sources abound and markets are very liquid. On the 
downside, it leads to a debt-deflation process, which, coupled with domino effects (i.e. the fact 
that banks are interrelated in such a way that the failure of one institution leads to problems for 
others), transforms a liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis: 
When there is a generalised liquidity problem attempts to deal with it will lead to declines 
in asset values, creating a solvency problem, even where none existed before. In short, 
there is an internal amplifying process (liquidity spirals) whereby a falling asset market 
leads banks, investment houses, etc., to make more sales (deleveraging), which further 
drives down asset prices and financial intermediaries’ assessed profit and loss and 
balance sheet net worth. (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 5) 
The report emphasizes especially maturity mismatch as a central cause of debt-deflation 
processes. Indeed, maturity mismatch creates a “funding liquidity risk,” i.e. a risk that 
refinancing will not be available or will only be provided at higher cost (margin requirement 
goes up, rollover finance sources close down, etc.). This risk is especially problematic when 
market liquidity is low (i.e., when an asset cannot be sold at a “reasonable” price (Brunnermeier 
et al. 2009: 12)), because liquidation is the only solution left once funding sources disappear or 
become prohibitively expansive. Once liquidation starts, steep declines in asset prices follow, 
resulting in a further increase in funding risk and ultimately a complete breakdown of the 
financial system. The report notes that the funding and market liquidity are endogenous rather 
than exogenous and bank specific. Indeed, during a boom, markets are liquid and there is a 
tendency for financial institutions to increase the maturity mismatch because short-term funding 
is cheaper. On the contrary, during a downturn, the opposite occurs.  
The Geneva report argues that the current international financial crisis shows the 
relevance of the previous concepts. In addition, the crisis shows that the risk of any economic   18
enterprise depends, not only on the intrinsic expected profitability of the project, but also on the 
way the latter is funded: 
One of the most critical lessons of this crisis is that, while regulators have been focused 
on asset quality, systemic risk has as much to do with how assets are funded. If two 
institutions have the same asset, but one funds with long-term debt and the other by 
borrowing overnight from the money markets, there is a substantial difference to the 
potential for systemic risk. (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 38) 
At the same time, however, the report notes that “current regulatory rules make little distinction 
between how the same assets are funded” (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 38) and only focus on credit 
risk, or other aspects internal to each company taken in isolation. It is important to take into 
account systemic risk because, decisions that may be rational at the individual level in order to 
maintain competitiveness can generate a great deal of systemic risk:  
From an individual bank/micro perspective, it was reasonable and efficient for each bank 
to assume that, in normal times, they would have access to the wholesale money markets. 
Once some banks made this assumption, banks that did not do so were put at a 
competitive disadvantage. […] At a micro-level this was not viewed as increasing risk, 
but reducing it by providing alternative and more flexible sources of funding. But the 
exploitation of market access by almost all banks in normal times, increased the 
likelihood of disaster in abnormal times. (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 6) 
Increasing reliance on refinancing may be necessary to maintain market share and, as a 
consequence, is seen as wise even though financial interdependences increase dramatically. In 
addition, AAA-rated assets are more sensitive to systemic risk because of their nature (only great 
economic troubles lead to default) and because of the greater potential of rating migration and 
increase in capital requirement in case of problems (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 6ff.), which 
increases the potential strength of the downward spirals presented above. 
Given this framework of analysis, the central recommendation of the report is that much 
more attention should be given to systematic risk induced by the financial practices of individual 
financial institutions: 
The current philosophy of banking regulation—that you can make the system safe by 
making individual institutions safe—is an unsatisfactory basis for insuring systemic 
stability. (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 37)   19
Because the funding method of assets is crucial to determine systemic risk, the report argues that 
a good way to account for systemic risk would be to include the former in financial regulation. 
This could be done by accounting for systemic risk in the calculation of capital and liquidity 
requirements, which “are the main staple of financial regulation” (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 45). 
The report proposes do so through two main tools. The first is a change in capital requirements in 
order to make it countercyclical, and the second is a change in the valuation procedure of assets 
called mark-to-funding. Overall, this would allow to put in place a “‘lean against the wind’ risk-
management approach” (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 30). 
In order to make capital requirements counter-cyclical, the report proposes to make them 
sensitive to proxies related to funding liquidity risk. More specifically, the capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) should be set as follows: 
CARt = CARmin  × β(leverage ratiot, maturity mismatcht, expected credit expansion of the bankt,  
asset-price expansiont) 
With β positively related to the variables in the parentheses. Through this means, capital 
adequacy ratios will limit the possibility of large upswings “by encouraging banks to find long-
term funding, and [by dissuading] them from greater leverage” (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 41) as 
systemic risk increases, which will also limit the risk of large downswings. In order to implement 
this tool, the report notes that the sensitivity of CAR to those variables will have to be 
determined properly and that: 
The current crisis inevitably calibrates our sense of what is an adequate degree of safety. 
Ten years ago, ensuring that funding maturities would allow institutions to survive a few 
weeks in the face of a disruption to money markets was considered adequate. In the 2007-
08 crisis, wholesale money markets have been more or less closed for many borrowers 
for over a year. (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 42) 
The report also notes that the calculation of value-at-risk should be complemented with CoVaR 
which means that: 
For determining which institutions are likely to experience distress in case of a systemic 
event, we condition the VaR of each institution on the event that the index return of the 
financial sector is at its VaR level. Note that the likelihood of being in distress in case of 
a systemic event depends to a large extent on the institution’s funding strategy (leverage, 
maturity mismatch, etc.) in addition to its asset holdings. To address the question to what   20
extent a particular institution contributes (in a non-causal sense) to the overall systemic 
risk (by being in distress when there is a system-wide distress), we reverse the 
conditioning. In this case, an institution’s CoVaR is defined as the VaR of the whole 
financial sector conditional on this institution being in distress. The difference between 
the CoVaR and unconditional financial industry VaR, ΔCoVaR, captures the marginal 
contribution of a particular institution (in a non-causal sense) to the overall systemic risk. 
(Adriany and Brunnermeier 2009: 2)  
CoVaR and other risk measures should be calculated mostly “by using primarily past ‘crisis 
data’ and underweighting recent and current data” (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 31). 
In order to measure the mismatch the report proposes to use the effective mismatch 
between asset maturity and funding maturity (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 41ff.). For liabilities, the 
effective maturity is usually the contractual time to maturity; however, for some demand 
liabilities (e.g., checking accounts), the effective maturity is better measured by looking at 
average withdrawals during stress periods rather than at the fact that those liabilities have an 
immediate maturity. For assets, they should be classified in function of their effective maturity, 
which would be measured in terms of the time necessary to sell them in a stressed environment 
and, for fully illiquid assets, on their time to maturity. Thus: 
If an asset can be sold to the central bank in a day and is funded with overnight 
borrowing, there is no maturity mismatch. On the other hand, if a twenty year mortgage 
may be sold in approximately 24 months, and is funded with overnight money, there is a 
significant maturity mismatch. (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 42) 
The second main recommendation of the report is to develop a mark-to-funding valuation 
procedure for assets. This procedure specifies the valuation-timeframe of an asset in function of 
the way it is funded. Indeed, whatever the intention of the asset holder in terms of asset position 
(speculation or operation), his “capacity to hold on to assets is driven by the maturity of the 
funding of the asset” (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 39). If funding is done on a short-term basis, 
there is a risk that this funding will evaporate and that the asset has to be sold immediately; 
therefore: 
if a bank has funded its twenty-year assets with one-month or shorter-term borrowings, 
then whatever their intention, they should value the asset using current market prices. If, 
however, the asset is funded with the issuance of a 10-year bond, the asset can be valued   21
by a third party valuer (to ensure against fraudulent valuations) on the basis of the present 
value of the likely average price over the next ten years. In particular, this long-run 
valuation can place less weight on current daily price volatility and more on valuing the 
expected cash flows over the next ten years. (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 39-40) 
Even though this may not remove all the procyclicality and volatility of mark-to-market 
valuation, especially for banks with short-term refinancing sources, “this would be a fair 
reflection of the price risk the firm faces if funding is not rolled over” (Brunnermeier et al. 2009: 
41). 
These two-core recommendations are accompanied by others that usually are more or less 
in line with other reports. For example, the Geneva report notes the need to bring compensations 
in line with the interest of stakeholders and of the going concern of the company, and the need to 
create a clearing mechanism for OTC market of systemic importance. The report also endorses 
the recommendation of the Treasury to create a mortgage origination authority that sets 
appropriate standards to qualify borrowers. In addition, it would remove CRAs from the 
regulatory framework and, for monetary policy purposes, the Geneva report recommends 
including asset prices into a broader measure of inflation. 
 
Critical Review 
This report, written by academic economists, is, by far, the most technically advanced and the 
richest in its theoretical underpinning. The report has many similarities with the Minskyan 
framework, among those are the importance of funding methods, the interaction among collateral 
value and lending, and the inconsistency of risk at the micro and macro level (what is safe and 
makes sense at the individual level may generate great systemic instability). The fact that the 
funding method is crucial to the success of an economic project was recognized a long time ago 
by Minsky and, contrary to what the report states, the current crisis does not provide anything 
new at this level: 
It is impossible to draw a meaningful investment demand function without 
simultaneously specifying the liabilities that will be emitted. (Minsky 1967: 47) 
A commandment for creating economic theory that is relevant for capitalist economies is: 
“Thou shalt not dichotomize” between the presumably real and the financial spheres of 
the economy. (Minsky 1990: 212)   22
The importance of financial issues (solvency, liquidity, monetary gains and losses) for economic 
activity is a novelty only for economists that believe in the neutrality of money. Minsky rejected 
this hypothesis from the very beginning of his career; money is never neutral is his framework 
because entrepreneurs are interested in making a monetary profit for the sake of the monetary 
profit. Output gains are of secondary importance for businessmen and, as Veblen argued, the 
sabotage of the production process may be a requirement to maintain monetary profitability.  
The importance of financial aspects directly leads to the financial instability hypothesis 
and Minsky (like Fisher (1933) and Veblen (1904)) also recognizes the importance of the 
interaction between asset prices and the availability of funding sources, and the interaction 
between liquidity and solvency. For example, on the downside Minsky notes that: 
The fall of asset prices and the “tightening” of normal sources of financing are, in this 
view, the essential ingredients financial crises and the process that leads to a deep 
depression. […] In a crisis due to systemic conditions, the need to sell assets to make 
position causes a fall in the prices of assets and decreases investment. […] As investment 
decreases profits of banks and businesses decline. This further decreases asset values. 
(Campbell and Minsky 1987: 256) 
The process works in a reverse manner during an expansion, as the Geneva report notes. 
However, the report fails to explain why this process emerges in the first place. Minsky noted 
that this was not mainly the result of greed, fraud, lack of foresight, poor financial education, 
asymmetry of information, mispricing, or any other “imperfection” of markets and individuals. 
On the contrary, he noted that a period of economic stability contains the seeds of instability. 
Indeed, economic stability justifiably improves the confidence of individuals, decreases their risk 
aversion, and, among other things, leads to a saturation of existing markets (Tymoigne 
forthcoming). Thus, not only are individuals and companies willing to lower their margins of 
safety, to take more risk, and to be more financially creative, but they are forced to do so by 
market mechanisms in order to maintain their profitability and market shares: 
In this framework, crises are not due to the special characteristics of any institution; 
crisis-prone situations emerge out of the normal profit-seeking activities of borrowers and 
lenders [over periods of enduring expansion]. The shift in the financial posture of units 
from hedge to speculative (rollover) and Ponzi (capitalizing of interest) characterizes the 
evolution from a robust financial structure, where most failures are due to idiosyncratic   23
attributes, to a fragile one, where systemic conditions are responsible for a large number 
of failures. (Campbell and Minsky 1987: 256) 
This is in sharp contrast to the view of most economists who argue that market mechanisms are 
stabilizing. For Minsky, market mechanisms are destabilizing, and, more broadly, any economic 
institution is dialectical in nature by promoting growth and innovation but also by promoting 
economic instability (Tymoigne 2009). 
This view of the economic process led Minsky, and other economists following is 
framework of analysis (e.g. Guttentag and Herring 1988), to recognize the importance of 
systemic regulation a long time ago, and it is good to see that some economists finally recognize 
the relevance of this approach. As Minsky noted: 
When conceived in terms of bank runs and defaults, a particular bank fails because of its 
own, idiosyncratic attributes. Its management has been incompetent or committed fraud. 
Such a failure may have repercussions on other banking institutions, in that for a time 
financial markets fail to work normally. This creates transitory refinancing problems for 
otherwise solvent banks. If refinancing problems persist and are sufficiently severe, they 
can cause a drop in asset prices large enough to cause otherwise solvent banks to fail […] 
A more complete description of the instability of an “economy with banking” needs to 
look behind the runs and analyze the structure of balance sheets payment commitments 
and position-making activities. Position-making for a bank consists of the transactions 
undertaken to bring the cash position to the level required by regulation or bank 
management. In the position-making view, bank failures do not arise simply because of 
incompetent or corrupt management. They occur mainly because of the interdependence 
of payment commitments and position-making transactions across institutions and units. 
(Campbell and Minsky 1987: 255-256) 
All this summarizes what the report stated regarding the limited relevance of the domino effects 
to explain crisis, and the relevance of the spirals that they noticed. Position-making risk, i.e., 
what the report calls funding-liquidity risk and market-liquidity risk, is indeed central to the 
development of a financial crisis and needs to be analyzed in details. Defaults and runs do not 
mostly happen by accident, lack of luck, and imperfections; their probability of occurrence 
increases over a period of economic expansion because position-making risk increases as 
financial positions progressively move from hedge to Ponzi. Therefore, one needs to understand   24
how position-making risk emerges and grows (hence the role of the financial instability 
hypothesis) and to figure out ways to prevent, or at least to constrain, its growth. 
Overall, in terms of theoretical framework and main policy implications, the report is, 
therefore, pretty close to Minsky. However, we are not sure that the report fully agrees with the 
Minskyan view, especially the financial instability hypothesis, which provides an explanation of 
why these dynamics exist in the first place. As shown below, the policy proposals of the report 
seem to give a hint that the authors of the Geneva report are not willing to go all the way toward 
Minsky’s framework of thought. 
Like for previous reports, the main aim of the Geneva report is to find ways to improve 
risk management by introducing the importance of liquidity and by improving the measurement 
of potential risk. In the report, this goes by proposing reforms that would make risk management 
more countercyclical and that would depend on rules rather than discretion. As the report 
correctly notes, it is important to find ways to make regulation bit when everybody complains 
about it and when it goes against the pursuit of business as usual. This is especially important 
over long periods of economic stability that have recorded years, if not decades, of smooth 
growth, and during times when business must find ways to grow by all means in order to 
maintain their competitiveness and to meet the demands of their stakeholders:  
To some extent, […] all risk management tools are unable to model/present the most 
severe forms of financial shocks in a fashion that is credible to senior management. […] 
To the extent that users of stress tests consider these assumptions to be unrealistic, too 
onerous, not strenuous enough, incorporating unlikely correlations or having similar 
issues which detract from their credibility, the stress tests can be dismissed by the target 
audience and its informational content thereby lost. (Counterparty Risk Management 
Policy Group III 2008: 70, 84) 
Anyone who thinks you can run bank regulation independent from the general political 
climate doesn’t understand. Suppose the Federal Reserve would have decided to be 
tougher in the seventies. There would have been an outcry, from the banks and the 
congressmen who get their contributions, from everyone who was sold on deregulation. 
“What the hell are you talking about? We haven’t had a banking loss for thirty years. So 
what the hell are you doing with new regulations?” Congressmen would come at us.   25
“Why do you regulators think you know more than our bank CEOs?” (Volcker in Greider 
[1987: 439-440]) 
Thus, periods of extended economic stability and strong competition can put tremendous 
political pressures on regulators and supervisors to be lenient if discretion is too high, and can 
lead to situations in which they are blamed for eroding the competitiveness of companies by 
being “too picky.”  
This countercyclical risk management strategy has some merits and will probably help to 
discouraged some risk-takers for a while. Regarding, mark-to-funding this may help indeed to 
account for price risk and is definitely an improvement over mark-to-market, even though, as the 
report recognizes, this may not help some institutions that are already matched in the short-term. 
Regarding, the need to make CAR more dependent on systemic risk, this was something that 
Minsky advocated a long time ago. In fact, he was highly critical of the Basel I Accord because 
of its lack of consideration for systemic risk:  
All the proposed reforms raise operating expenses or reduce profits of banks that 
examiners find to be in a higher risk class. Raising the operating costs of banks who, 
because of changes in systemic conditions, have become riskier will only make those 
institutions more vulnerable to failure. Risk-related premiums or risk-adjusted capital 
requirements would be pro-cyclical, worsening the condition of banks just when other 
operating costs are rising and profits are being squeezed. If implemented at all, risk-
related premiums should be adjusted downward for systemic conditions even as they are 
raised for the presumed riskier institutions. (Campbell and Minsky 1987: 258) 
The Geneva report shows very well how relevant this position is. 
However, this willingness to improve risk management rather than reform financial 
regulation and supervision in a more radical way has several flaws. First of all, it is a fact of life 
that in a society in which people are free to choose, they hate being told what to do or to be 
constrained in their decisions, especially financial decisions. This is all the more so when those 
regulatory constraints are in the way of lucrative business activities, competitiveness, large egos, 
and immediate improvement in the standards of living. As a consequence, people and companies 
will adapt to the new regulatory framework and will innovate their financial practices in order to 
bypass (government and private) regulatory constraints. Given that dramatic changes in 
regulation only occur during crises and are done mostly with the input of financial institutions   26
(which then know all the regulatory holes in the new law), the innovative drive is sure to make 
the new regulatory framework very rapidly irrelevant. Again, Minsky was ahead of all of us on 
this issue: 
To the extent that the examination procedure lags rather than anticipates financial 
innovation, higher insurance premiums [and capital requirements] on what examiners 
take to be riskier institutions may not be a deterrent to risk-taking. In an expanding 
economy, the increased cost of doing business caused by higher deposit insurance 
premiums [and capital requirements] will be an incentive for banks to invent new, 
unregulated forms of financing. (Campbell and Minsky 1987: 258) 
Thus, we need something different from a reactive and rigid regulation of risk practices:  
Anticipatory vigilance upon the part of the regulators is required to prevent increased risk 
exposure. But such vigilance, combined with intelligence, could contain particular unit 
risk exposure without the imposition of risk-related premiums or capital requirements. 
(Campbell and Minsky 1987: 258) 
Having a proactive and flexible regulatory framework that constantly accounts for financial 
innovations and includes them immediately in regulations would be much better than improving 
risk-management. 
A second problem with the view that improving risk management will improve financial 
stability, is that it is a highly permissive policy. Basically, financial institutions are allowed to do 
whatever they want as long as they meet the regulatory requirements defined by the norms. It 
does not matter what financial practices they have and how excessive the risk they take is, as 
long as capital is “high enough” and that they have a “prudent” maturity matching and amount of 
reserves. Unfortunately, matched maturities, low leverage ratio and high liquidity ratio are not 
necessarily a reflection of prudent and well-managed business, and a company may be able to 
sustain those ratio only by participating in a Ponzi process (either as a direct manager, or, more 
seriously, as part of the growth process of the overall economy). To take an analogy, it does not 
matter how many times a day a kid brushes his teeth, eating candy continuously will result in 
cavities and a diabetic condition. As we stated earlier, it does not matter how stringent prudential 
ratios are, nor how fine-tuned they are (the number of times the kid must brush his teeth depends   27
on the sugar content of the candy); they are not tackling the problem at its core (the kid eats too 
many candies)
1 and the collapse of a Ponzi process will very rapidly wipe them out. 
Third, as the report notes, setting the appropriate weight on maturity mismatch and other 
proxies of systemic risk is heavily influenced by our current experience. Overtime, financial 
institutions may claim that this weight is too stringent and does not reflect the fact that the 
institutional framework has changed and that financial innovations are now better able to account 
for systemic risk. They will put forward, as ultimate proof, the “long” period of stability and 
record profitability and competitiveness. As a consequence, there may be pressures to lower the 
weight attached to systemic risk, or pressures to overlook facts that may call for rising CAR. 
This is so even if CARs are set in function of a rule and it may take the form of a legalization of 
new “creative” accounting practices. In addition, setting too stringent weights will constrain 
economic growth and will draw further complaints. 
All these problems lead to a fourth problem. Indeed, bad regulation is destabilizing and 
creates perverse incentives that compound the weaknesses of an existing regulatory framework. 
Thus, inappropriate regulation and supervision may contribute to the emergence and diffusion of 
a Ponzi process at the level of the overall economy.  
Overall, therefore, we need something better than a new reactive regulatory and 
supervisory framework. We need a proactive framework built around the core concept of 
position-making operations coupled with the financial instability hypothesis. This regulatory 
framework would not be based on institution, function, or product but on the financial practices 
of specific entities, a sector of the economy, and the whole economy. This practice would guide 
proposed changes in institutional structures and the regulation of financial products. This 
regulatory framework would be far reaching, would be quickly adaptable and would be applied 
to all financial institutions without exception, and would involve the participation of many 
participants of society, not just the financial sector. All this brings forward the notion of Ponzi 
finance that is partly tackled in the report through its focus on maturity matching. This is an 
important and highly relevant point but it is not sufficient.  
                                                 
1 The interesting twist with market mechanisms is that eating candy continuously may be a requirement of 
the “invisible hand” in order to prolong (temporarily) competitiveness and economic survival. As a consequence, 
this behavior may have strong economic, social, and political backing (coupled with strong patriotic sentiments). 
The temporary survival of entire economic sectors may depend on such a “judicious” behavior. If that is the case, it 
means that sooner or later, unless massive restructuring occurs, those economic sectors are doomed to disappear 
(probably after a long and painful agony). Promoting a systemic view of financial stability based on detecting Ponzi 
finance would help to restructure an industry sooner and in a less painful way.   28
First, as we have noted previously the crucial matter that determines Ponzi finance is 
cash-flow mismatch, i.e., the fact that net cash flows from operation are expected to be too low 
to meet cash outflows on debt commitments. Even if maturities are matched, there may still be a 
need to refinance and liquidate. In fact, many deals are structured in such a ways that liquidation 
is a prerequisite for the success of the project. The spirals that the Geneva report puts forward are 
not eliminated by matching maturity, what we need is a refocus of banking activity toward cash-
flow rather that collateral value: 
A cash-flow orientation by bankers is conducive to sustaining a robust financial structure. 
An emphasis by bankers on the collateral value and the expected values of assets is 
conducive to the emergence of a fragile financial structure (Minsky 1986 [2008]: 261) 
This point was discussed earlier in reference to the measurement of creditworthiness. Bankers 
need to play their role of skeptics and need to analyze painstakingly the sources of cash inflow of 
a customer, while not qualifying those who only meet the demands of a financial product on the 
basis of further access to refinancing or liquidation. 
Second, maturity mismatch does not deal with the dynamics of the financial instability 
hypothesis, i.e. the fact that banks, entrepreneurs, and households are willing, and are forced, to 
take more risk as the economic expansion goes on:  
None of the reforms creates a mechanism to correct for disaster myopia. Disaster myopia 
is the tendency for the subjective probability of disaster to decline with the passage of 
time as the experience of the previous disaster recedes from memories. […] The structure 
of deposit insurance and countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy that are used 
successfully contain a crisis in one period are not likely to permanently stabilize a 
monetary economy in which financial innovations occur in response to profit 
opportunities. Recent innovations in the securitization of assets and the globalization of 
finance have introduced risks of financial dislocations that are only peripherally related to 
those the authorities are set up to handle. (Campbell and Minsky 1987: 259) 
This notion of disaster myopia (taken from Guttentag and Herring [1984]) deals in part with the 
willingness to take more risk. Economic entities also are required to take more risk as the 
expansion persists because markets saturate, which leads to financial innovations requiring more 
leverage to compensate for declining returns, and to the courting of riskier borrowers to maintain 
lending volumes. Thus, given a maturity mismatch, over periods of expansion the margins of   29
safety of hedge finance positions decline (which generates a higher probability that hedge 
finance will turn speculative or Ponzi) and the proportion of Ponzi processes grow. 
Maturity mismatch, as measured by the Geneva report (effective maturity), still does not 
help to solve problems induced by the need to liquidate assets and the spirals analyzed 
previously. Indeed, the liquidation of an asset, even a very liquid asset, may only occur at a huge 
discount, leading to insufficient cash inflow to meet demands on creditors. Similarly on the 
liability side, in periods of crisis, creditors demand accelerated repayment schedules and lower 
available credit lines, which reduces dramatically the effective maturity of liabilities (Rudolf 
2009). Thus measuring the latter during good times will hide potential risks, and measuring it 
based on crisis periods will lead to complaints by banks during periods of stable economic 
activity. Finally, the notion of effective maturity shows that, in fact, what matters are cash-flow 
patterns and the detection of cash-flow mismatches. For example, say that an economic entity 
has a perfect maturity matching with a 10-year fully amortized promissory note on its asset side 
and a 10-year unamortized debt on its liability side. Even though both maturities are matched, 
the cash-flow pattern of those two sides is extremely different, leading probably to a need to 
refinance in 10 years. 
Overall, therefore, the report has some important recommendations that are drawn from a 
framework partially similar to Minsky. However, the report does not go the whole way in terms 
of the regulatory implications. It is a minimalist “light-touch” approach that, like the reforms of 
the past thirty years, involved playing on incentives and letting people decide based on those 
incentives. Businesses and people are supposed to know best and to be guided properly by the 
“invisible hand” of the “market” to fulfill their own interest and to promote social harmony 
altogether. We need a stronger regulation that constrains financial practices because market 
mechanisms always end up generating financial instability, no matter how well-informed and 
well-behaved individuals are; something that the Geneva report probably does not accept. We 
need a regulation that promotes strong financial practices and constructive competition, and this 
requires the visible hand of the government rather than a promotion of pure and perfect 
competition (through an improvement of the transparency of information and other market 
mechanisms). Excessive risk should not be allowed because the latter is characterized by very 
high unexpected losses, which means that capital and liquidity will evaporate rapidly even if 
“prudent” management risk is followed. By focusing on detecting, discouraging and, if necessary, 
forbidding Ponzi financial practices, regulation will take a large step toward directly managing   30
excessive risk taking as well as frauds. This can be done by having independent accountable and 
powerful supervisory agencies that prosecute crooks, terminate all pyramid Ponzi processes, 
monitor innovations, create a patent system, and focus regulation on systemic risk through 
frequent meetings involving many parts of the economy and through the development of 
measures of cash flows and position-making risks.   31
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